Education Reform and Social Cohesion in Lebanon

It is no secret that the MENA region has had a sweeping education reform as the result of the Arab Spring, although the result of this reform, up till now, has not had the desired effect ( Read here).  Lebanon is no strange to education reform. In the post-war torn country, Lebanon sought to reform its education sector to create social cohesion amongst its divided sectarian and religious groups (based on the premise that the cause of the 15 year civil war was religious and sectarian, although  many historians argue that social injustice, masked in religious and sectarian factions, was what spiraled Lebanon into a destructive civil war). Two education reforms were thus conceived and implemented, the Educational Recovery Plan in post war Lebanon in 1994, and the National Action Plan for Education for All in 2005.

However, two questions arise as we ponder on education reform in Lebanon, a conflict-prone country: 1- Who takes decisions on the need, nature, and implementation of the education reform? 2- To what degree is the education reform successful? and 3- Does the education reform help create social cohesion in Lebanon?

Who Shapes Education Reform Policies in Lebanon?

Only three research centers represent the education research in the country: the Center for Educational Research and Development (CERD, public), Lebanese Association for Education Studies (LAES, private), and the Lebanese Studies Center (LASC, Private). However, education research in the country suffers from two perennial problems: dearth and inferiority. A survey of the education research in Lebanon, including those administered by international entities like the World Bank, UNESCO, UNICEF etc. shows the deficit of education research. Education research in the country is also of inferior quality. The majority of published studies are not empirical, and those that are rely on surveys, case studies, and superficial quantitative analysis. If one reads more closely, most of these studies can be classified as pilot studies, for example administered surveys are not tested for reliability and validity. This implies that the study results, which should inform and impact education reform policies are not necessarily reflective of reality. In addition, most grants are used for developing textbooks instead of publishing, first and foremost, original research.

Furthermore, Shuayb (2015) argues that although there is a durable relationship between research, education policies, and reform in Lebanon, it is marred with intermittent fluctuations. Based on a case study of LAES, Shuayb concludes that there are six factors influencing the relationship between policy makers and research centers. The first three helped converge policy makers with research centers while the latter three had a divergent effect on their relationship.

1. Policy brokers: Since research centers play a passive role in influencing education reform decisions, policy brokers are necessary to push the findings to policy makers and persuade them to adopt the findings in formulating reform policies.
2. Donors: Donors play dichotomous influence on education research. They might have their own agendas, and consequently directing research efforts away from the country’s needs. At other times, especially international donors, might help research centers focus on current needs.
3. Quality of Independent Research Institutes: Based on the case study, Shuayb argues that the research enters are “reputable” as LAES “boasts an impressive record of publications”.
4. Undervalued research culture at the ministry: There is a lack of collaborative research culture at the ministry. Partly political, but primarily due to the lack on institutional structure to promote the value of research and linking research to practice. This has lead to the dwindling role of CERD in the past 15 years.
5. Reluctance of LAES members to influence policy: Many LAES members are reluctance  to influence policy, acting as “hermits” instead of “activists”. This due largely to fear of being in conflict with political entities. As a result, LAES mainly focuses on publishing studies of anyone who wants to use them.
6. A weak professional identity: This refers to the self-identity of LAES members. They see themselves as indirectly influencing policies. They do not want to drift into populist activism. They are reluctant to work with young researchers by prohibiting them from becoming members.

Did the Two Education Reform Plans Enhance Social Cohesion?

Therefore, the problem of education reform in Lebanon can be addressed on three inter-connected levels: 1- quality empirical research 2- Communication:  dissemination of knowledge 3- collaboration.  But how does the education reform in Lebanon try to create social cohesion, an important quality of a society to ensure equality? Shuayb (2016) reviews the two education reforms of  1997 and 2010 (They were operationalized in those years) against Novelli, Lopes Cardozo and Smith (2014)’s 4Rs  analytical framework for examining education ins conflict-prone societies: Redistribution, Recognition, Representation, and Reconciliation (depicted below). The framework priamiliry analyzes the education reform ability to sustain peacebuilding.

The review found that both reforms highlighted the disseminative dimension of social cohesion evidenced in the emphasis on the Right to Education for all. In 2010, access to education has been extended to include early years. The 1994 reform plan restructured the educational system by giving more choice to students in the secondary phase and offering vocational students the opportunity to join higher education. What’s more important, the plan largely advocated on restoring the image of public schools and rebuilding many of the schools destroyed during the war. However, currently, private schools continue to be magnet schools the majority of Lebanese students for several reasons, but not limited to: the (publicly perceived) poor quality of education in public schools, the state financial allowances given to public servants to enroll their children in private schools, and the ownership of private schools by several politicians. In addition, both reforms, 1994 and 2010, did not remark how they will address the educational gaps between regions. They also discounted the education of refugee children.

There is ample weight given to citizenship and recognition of diversity of religions in both reforms but was more salient in the 1994 reform as it was excogitated directly after the civil war. However, “teaching the 1997 unified Citizenship textbooks for over 25 years did not put an end to the clashes between the Lebanese nor did it bring about a peaceful Lebanon. Research on Citizenship education in Lebanon revealed a number of shortcomings. The heavily nationalistic flare adopted in the 1997 Citizenship textbooks seemed to be more concerned with civic literacy than civic participation (Shuayb 2012)”. “Content analysis of these textbooks revealed major gender biases, and social stereotyping (Shuayb 2015; Zoreik 2000). In the classroom, researchers showed that most practices emphasized rote learning (Abouchedid et al. 2002; Akar 2007; Shuayb 2007; 2012; UNDP 2009)”. In many cases, teachers avoided “dialogic pedagogies” in fear of disputes amongst students and with parents (Akar 2007; Zakharia 2012). What’s more, the bulk of students were not much cognizant of sects other than their own, and felt their chief sense of belonging was to their family and sect rather than to their nation (tribal world). The unified yet linear narrative, habituated in most public Lebanese schools, provides children with no opportunity to question and respond to essential and existential questions. Rather, they learn only to regurgitate for assessments. Another shortcoming of the reform in terms of recognition is that of language. The 1994 education reform stipulated that textbooks of Maths and Sciences are published in three languages (Arabic, English, French) up till Grade 6, after which only English and French textbooks are offered. This has increased drop out rates.  Children, particularly boys in the North of Lebanon and Bekaa as well as refugees in Palestinian camps had the highest drop-out rate and lowest completion rate (Shuayb 2014). It can be contended that the language policy in Lebanon has exasperated education inequalities in Lebanon and has destined the education accomplishment of many children from disadvantaged backgrounds to failure.

Regarding representation and participation, the process of the 1994 reform was majorly inclusive of the diverse religious, sectarian and economic sectors in Lebanon. Teachers, principals, researchers, and academics from both the private and public sectors were involved in the reform. The two main stakeholders missing from this participatory approach were Lebanese and Palestinian students and parents. As for the 2010 reform, its development process was limited to academics belonging to a small association of educationalists. Currently  students in public schools are forbidden to have students’ councils, or participate in demonstrations or political parties. Teachers are also denied the right to demonstrate or to form unions. In fact, in the name of reconciliation and peace, students’ and teachers’ voices continue to be suppressed.

While reconciliation was the meridian objective and highest precedence of the 1994 reform as posited in the aims of the curriculum, it is also addressed in the 2010 strategy, which essays to further nationalism through Citizenship education. According to the 1994 plan, the measures taken to promote reconciliation include attempting to reunify History textbooks and building one shared memory and narrative of the past. It also sought to replace sectarian Religious education with a unified Religious education textbook. However, both attempts have failed. The heads of the various sectarian groups blocked attempts to unify Religious education. “The best that could be achieved at that time was to make Religious education optional for the principals to decide whether to include it or not. If offered, a religious leader who belongs to the same sect as the majority of students in the school teaches the subject using textbooks designed by the council of the religious group. Students belonging to other sects can choose to attend the class or leave, which exacerbates divisions.”

Abouchedid, K, R. Nasser and J. Van Blommestein. 2002. The limitations of inter-group learning in confessional school systems: The case of Lebanon. Arab Studies Quarterly 2(4): 61‒82.

Akar, B. 2007. Citizenship education in Lebanon: An introduction into students’ concepts and learning experiences. Educate 7(2): 2‒18.

Novelli, M., M. Lopes Cardozo and A. Smith. 2014. Consortium on education and peacebuilding, research briefing 2: Theoretical and analytical framework. Learning for Peace. Retrieved from: http://learningforpeace.unicef.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/PBEA-Briefing-Paper-2- Nov14-FINAL.pdf (accessed 21 November 2016).

Shuayb, M., ed. 2012. Rethinking education for social cohesion: International case studies. London: Palgrave McMillan.

Shuayb, M. 2014. The art of inclusive exclusions: Educating the Palestinian refugee students in Lebanon. Refugee Survey Quarterly 33(2): 1‒18.

Shuayb, M. (2015). Who shapes education reform policies in Lebanon ? The role of research centres Education in Lebanon and Reform. Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education, 1–27. https://doi.org/10.1080/03057925.2018.1434409

Shuayb, M. (2016). EDUCATION FOR SOCIAL COHESION ATTEMPTS IN LEBANON: REFLECTIONS ON THE 1994 AND 2010 EDUCATION REFORMS. Education as Change, 20(3), 225–242. https://doi.org/10.17159/1947-9417/2016/1531

UNDP. 2009. Lebanon 2008‒2009: The national human development report ‒ Towards a citizen’s state. Beirut: UNDP.

Zakharia, Z. 2012. Education and peacebuilding in crisis and post-conflict contexts: Lebanon country study. New York: UNICEF.

Zoreik, A. 2000. Civics education: How do we deal with it. Beirut: Arab Scientific Publishers.